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ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
G. W. HAIGHT*
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

During the past few years there has been extensive discussion regarding the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws and some
attempts have been made to consider the matter in the context of
public international law principles.' Notwithstanding objections raised
by foreign governments to court orders and subpoenas directed to
foreign corporations in relation to their activities abroad, some commentators still appear to consider that there are few, if any, limitations
imposed by law upon such assertions of penal power. This position requires re-examination, and in undertaking a review it will be relevant
to consider the nature and effect of new antitrust legislation in Europe.
So long as the resources and peoples of the world are organized in
the form of nation states and these are independent and sovereign,
certain overriding considerations apply. It would be difficult to find
these better put than in the following extracts from Story:
The first and most general maxim or proposition is that . . . every
nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
territory. The direct consequence of this rule is, that the laws of every
state affect and bind directly all property, whether real or personal,
within its territory, and all persons who are resident within it, . . . and

also all contracts made and acts done within it. A state may therefore
regulate the manner and circumstances under which property ... within
it, shall be held, transmitted, bequeathed, transferred, or enforced; ...
the validity of contracts and other acts done within it; the resulting
rights and duties growing out of these contracts and acts; and the
remedies and modes of administering justice ...
Another maxim or proposition is, that no state or nation can by its
laws directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind
*
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persons not resident therein, whether they are natural-born subjects or
others.....
for it would be wholly incompatible with the equality and
exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should
be at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its own territory. It would be equivalent to a declaration that the sovereignty over a
territory was never exclusive in any nation, but only concurrent with
that of all nations; that each could legislate for all, and none for itself;
and that all might establish rules which none were bound to obey.
The absurd results of such a state of things need not be dwelt upon.2
The basic principle of exclusive territorial sovereignty was more
recently affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
The Case of the S.S. "Lotus":
[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contraryit may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule
derived from international custom or from a convention. (Emphasis
added.)S
Speaking in the same case, John Bassett Moore, the United States
Judge, said:
It is an admitted principle of international law that a nation possesses
and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception to this right must be traced to the consent
of the nation, either express or implied . . . (Emphasis added.) 4
In the Lotus case all of the judges accepted the overriding limitation of exclusive territorial jurisdiction. While much has transpired
during the thirty years since this judgment was rendered, the community of nations still consists, as Judge Loder said "of a collection
of different sovereign and independent States" 5 and the consequence
of this must be that each has exclusive control over the regulation
of the society that exists within the limits of its own territory.
Where the judges divided in the Lotus case was on the question
whether, on the facts, the offense of criminal negligence could be
regarded as having been committed within the territory of the prosecuting State. Because the acts of the French officer on board the
French vessel produced effects on board the Turkish vessel with
which it collided, and because these effects caused the death of Turkish
2. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TM CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) quoted in
Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Committed
by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 303, 304 (1934).
3. P C.I.J.. Ser. A, No. 9, at 18 (1927).
4. Id. at 68.
5. Id. at 34. "Public international law is governed by the principle of territoriality. This principle is universally recognized in the practice and legal
literature of all civilized nations." Friedmann and van Themaat, supra note 1,
at 486.
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nationals, a majority of the judges held that the offense had been committed within such territory. It was said that the "effects ... felt on
board the Boz-Kourt" were, "legally, entirely inseparable" from the
act of "negligence or imprudence" which had its origin on board
the Lotus. In fact, these effects were so much a part of the act
that produced them "that their separation renders the offence nonexistent." 6 A minority of the judges disagreed that in this case the
offense could be said to have been committed where the effects were
7
produced.
Although the decision of the majority as to the locus of the crime
would have sufficed to establish the jurisdictional competence of
Turkey, views were expressed regarding the freedom of a State
to apply its laws and to extend the jurisdiction of its courts to
persons, property and acts outside its territory. It was said that international laws does not contain any general prohibitions against a State
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory over acts which have taken
place abroad. On the contrary, international law leaves a State "a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules." Otherwise, "every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable."8
A majority of the permanent members of the court disagreed that
"everything which is not prohibited is permitted"9 and it is perhaps
significant that these members comprised the American, British,
French, Dutch, Danish and Spanish judges. As one of the judges put it:
6. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9 at 30 (1927).
7. See Judge Loder (Netherlands): "The criminal law of a State . . .

cannot extend to offences committed by a foreigner in foreign territory, without infringing the sovereign rights of the foreign State concerned. . . ." Id. at

35; Judge Weiss (France): "[E]very State has jurisdiction to sentence and

punish the perpetrators of offences committed within its territory ....
But,
outside the territory, the frontier having once been traversed, the right of
States to exercise police duties and jurisdiction ceases to exist. . . ." Id. at 44;
Lord Finlay (Great Britain): "A country is no more entitled to assume jurisdiction over foreigners than it would be to annex a bit of territory which
happened to be very convenient for it." Id. at 56; and Judge Nyholm (Den-

mark): "The present case, which concerns the fact of a nation having ex-

tended its jurisdiction to a foreigner in regard to acts committed by the latter
in his own country, supplies an example of an actual infringement of the

principle of territoriality ...

[Iut cannot be maintained-as the judgment sets

out-that, failing a positive restrictive rule, States leave other States free to
edict their legislations as they think fit and to act accordingly, even when, in
contravention of the principle of territoriality, they assume rights over foreign

subjects for acts which the latter have committed abroad." Id. at 60. In its
Commentary on proposed articles concerning the law of the sea, the International Law Commission says that this judgment "was very strongly

criticized and caused serious disquiet in international circles." The Com-

mission concurred with the decisions of the conference held at Brussels in
1952, which were embodies in the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or

Other Incidents of Navigation, Brussels May 10, 1952. REPORT OF THE INTEMATIONAL LAw ComimssIoN, General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh
Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/3159), 1956, at p.27.
8. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9 at 19 (1927).
9. Judge Loder, id. at 34.
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[T]he freedom which, according to the argument put forward, every
State enjoys to impose its own laws relating to jurisdiction upon foreigners is and must be subject to limitations. In the case of competing claims
to jurisdiction . . . this freedom is conditioned by the existence of the

express or tacit consent of other States and particularly of the foreign
State directly interested. As soon as these States protest, the abovementioned freedom ceases to exist ....

The necessity for consent is just

as much a fundamental principle of international law, which is entirely
based on the will of States, as the principle of the protection of nationals
To accept the contrary view
or of the freedom to legislate internally ....
would, in my opinion, be to neglect one of the fundamental conditions
of the international community and would result in opening the door to
continual conflicts which might involve most undesirable consequences.10
It thus appears that in the view of all the judges there is an outer
limit to any assertion by a State of the right to prosecute foreigners for
their acts abroad and this is set by the overriding prohibition of international law against the application by a State of its power in any
form within the territory of another State.
In antitrust cases this may prove to be the governing limitation, but
the narrower limits recognized by the dissenting judges may also be
relevant, particularly if protests and conflicts are to be avoided. That
this is recognized by our courts is evident from the emphasis placed on
"effects" and "consequences" in cases involving acts beyond the territorial limits of the United States." In this way attempts are made to
bring such cases within the objective principle that the place where
an offense is committed is the place where the criminal act takes
effect, so that a State may, in accordance with the territorial principle,
punish acts performed abroad which produce prohibited effects within
its territory. It is not always apparent from these cases, however,
that the test of inseparability referred to in the court's judgment in
the Lotus case is met; namely, that the acts abroad "are, legally, entirely inseparable" from the effects "so that their separation renders
the offence non-existent."' 1 Apart from this, however, is the broader
question whether the limitations imposed by international law upon
the exercise of penal jurisdiction over foreigners permit the test of
objectivity to be applied to the antitrust "crime" so as to enable any
State to contend that acts wherever committed may be punished
wherever they produce "effects."
Unless international law imposes some limits to the extraterritorial
10. Judge Altamira, id. at 103.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
12. Thus, there does not appear to have been any proof in United States v.
Aluminum Company, supra note 11, that the foreign cartel arrangements had
produced direct and material effects on American commerce. The district
court held that the burden was on the Government to establish such effects and
that they had failed to do so. 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The appellate
court reversed, holding that, intent to restrain imports having been established, the burden was on the defendants to prove the absence of such effects.
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application of penal legislation, States could devise their own lists of
crimes and then punish foreigners as they see fit without regard, to
the places where acts were performed. 13 Thus, a State could make
it a crime to criticize its politicians and then punish the editors of
foreign newspapers who express such criticism. Or it could prohibit
dealings in its currency and then punish foreign bankers who buy and
sell such currency abroad. If this were permitted, journalists and
bankers would travel from one jurisdiction to another at their peril
and their governments would have no grounds to protest against their
imprisonment for having produced harmful effects within the terri14
tories of the offended States.
Essentially the enforcement of antitrust laws is a method of regulating trade. Americans are by no means alone in their conviction that
a competitive free enterprise society is the most satisfactory social
pattern, but other nations approach the task of removing competitive
restraints in different ways. As will appear from the latter part of this
article, prohibitory legislation is not always the fashion, and even
where it does take this form broad considerations of public policy
continue to apply. The States that are actively and vigorously tackling
this problem today recognize that not all combinations, not all restrictive practices are bad, nor are bad ones always bad. The emphasis is
frequently on the removal of abuses; sometimes participants are required to show that their arrangements promote rather than fetter the
public good; sometimes the burden is on some state agency to establish
that particular practices are harmful.
These alternative approaches are due to a variety of circumstances.
Every legislature dealing with this subject is required to reconcile the
demands of consumers, workers, producers, distributors, exporters, importers and other social groups, and to give effect to the theories of
economists, sociologists, lawyers and other experts. Where agriculture
predominates, the emphasis may be on combinations of small and
large producers who seek to offset the hazards of cultivation by col13. In his comment on Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] A.C.
347, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht says that this case "cannot be adduced in support
of the proposition that a State has unlimited jurisdiction over an alien for acts
which have been committed abroad and which it considers to be prejudicial
to its safety. There is no warrant in international law for a rule of such
alarming comprehensiveness. An individual in one State cannot be expected
to exhibit scrupulous care in respecting the interests of other States or to
incur the dangers of criminal prosecution in case he should, voluntarily or involuntarily, come into the power of those States." Lauterpacht, Allegiance,
DiplomaticProtection and CriminalJurisdiction over Aliens, 9 CAM. L.J. 330,
347 (1947). "[T]he power of the State with respect to foreigners . . . .with
respect to the determination of the existence of what is a crime . ... is
never unlimited ...." International law "forbids the punishment of any acts
which merely constitute the exercise of a right guaranteed and protected by
the State in whose territory they have been carried out .... ." Bourquin, Crimes
et Ddlits contre la SuretM des Etats Etrangers,1(1927) Recueil des Cours de 1'
Academie de Droit International 188.
14. See BaIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 185 (3d ed. 1942).
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lective price maintenance and production quotas, particularly in the
area of exports. On the other hand, in countries which are mainly industrial vigorous competition may be accepted as an essential spur
to progressive development and a healthy economy.
. Whatever the circumstances may be and whatever the method
adopted to deal with them, it is apparent that antitrust laws are by
their very nature in a class apart from ordinary legislation relating
to crime. Offenses against the person, such as murder, manslaughter,
assault, or against property, such as theft procuring property by
false pretenses, fraud, embezzlement, and even offenses such as
libel, sedition, treason and counterfeiting, are commonly regarded
as disruptive of the common good and basically evil. Restrictive business practices fall into an entirely different category.
There is nothing inherently evil in two competitors agreeing to
eliminate competition between themselves. 15 Our own rule of reason
recognizes this. Moreover, what might be unreasonable in the form of
an agreement between independent business units may be acceptable
when accomplished by means of a merger. Similarly, price fixing may
be a social evil in one community or line of business but justified
elsewhere.' 6 Limitations on production may be reprehensible in times
of scarcity but essential in times of overabundance. 1 Boycotts and
restrictions on newcomers may be condemned as regards internal trade
but countenanced when they take the form of tariff barriers or quota
restrictions designed to exclude foreigners. 18 Free trade may be the
rule for some, but not for all. Competition may be the key to and
the safeguard of free enterprise or it may be the law of the jungle
where only the large and strong can survive.
In view of these essential divergencies of an antitrust law from
a statute dealing with a common crime, what principle of international
law should govern the application of the former to the nationals of
another country? Should a showing of "effects" justify a claim of
15. See Holmes J., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
404-05 (1904); note 28 and 29 infra.

16. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GmEq A!s NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE

ANTITRUST LAws 270-77 (1955). See also conclusions of the British Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission concerning price fixing arrangements relating to the supply of electric lamps, insulated electric wires and
cables, semi-manufacturers of copper, pneumatic tires and linoleum; sum-

marized in

WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL AND ELLIS, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE

573, 578, 599, 604, 609 (1957).
17. Cf. Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
18. Domestic opposition to imports of foreign watches, bicycles, motorcycles and wool has been particularly noticeable in recent years. It was reported in London in August, 1957, that seven petitions for relief under the
escape clause provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Act were awaiting action
by the Tariff Commission and that the list included bicycles, stainless-steel
flatware, spring clothespins, nonwoven wool felt, umbrella frames, garlic
PRACTICES

AND MONOPOLIES,

and clinical thermometers. TnE FINANCIAL TnvMs (London), Aug. 19, 1957.

See Eckhoff, Norway, in ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 281
(Friedmann ed. 1956).
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jurisdiction by analogy to the cases dealing with bullets flying across
a border or the theft of property? Wholly apart from the difficulties
involved in defining "effects" and a lack of international consent to an
extension of the common crime case to that of trade regulation, is
there not a more serious objection to any such claim? In applying its
antitrust law to activities within the territory of another, is not a
State exercising a power of regulation over such activities and by
the use of subpoenas, orders and decrees compelling the observance
of such exercise in such territory? Is this not such an intrusion into
the affairs of another State as requires the consent of that State in
order to avoid an abusive exercise of sovereign power?
It is submitted that it is, and that the governing principle is and
must be that each State is free to regulate the conduct of trade and
commerce within its own borders as it sees fit and without interference
by other States except to the extent that it has given its consent
thereto. Surely it is a perversion of the territorial principle to stretch
objectivity to the point of permitting such regulation where such consent has not been obtained. No one questions the exclusive right
of each nation to regulate its own tariffs, to incorporate "its own
companies, to establish its own currency and to deal with the myriad
of activities that comprise the commercial structure of a society. Nevertheless, if any nation were free to deal with acts performed in another
State on the ground of "effects," there is hardly anything in this age
of interdependence and rapid communication that would not be caught.
It is just such pretensions that have led in recent years to protests by
foreign governments. 19
19. Protests and counter measures by foreign governments are noted in
LAW 72-75 (1956). The British Government took a
strong stand in November, 1952, on the attempts by a Washington grand jury
to obtain documents from British companies: "Her Majesty's Government
considers it contrary to international comity that British companies should be
required to produce documents which are not only not in the United States,
but which do not even relate to business in that country .... With regard
to acts arising in this country, the normal view ... would be that they should
be investigated under the British law. ..2" HANSARD, H.C., November 17, 1952,
col. 1384. In commenting on this and the enforced breakup of the duPont-I.C.I.
JEsSUP, TRANSNATIONAL

partnership in Canada, The Economist observed that "these recent manifesta-

tions of the international consequences of antitrust procedure are alarming."
Comity and the Oil Companies, Nov. 22, 1952. The Economist, p. 556. More
recently official protests have been made in connection with the issuance of
subpoenas to English and French companies in a grand jury investigation
in the Southern District of New York into possible violations of the antitrust laws in the radio-television industry. In connection with motions for
the production of documents in United States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil
No. 86-27, S.D.N.Y., the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington has stated
in a letter that the Netherlands Government is "very disappointed at
the actions of the United States Attorney General" directed to "a search of
the foreign files of ... companies . . .which are under Netherlands jurisdic-

tion" and that it views such action "with grave concern." It is said: "The
fundamental principles of the Netherlands legal system imply that Nether-

lands cartel legislation, together with specific decisions by the Nether-

lands Authorities on questions of cartel policy, must in principle be decisive
in this matter as regards the conduct of business and industry in Netherlands
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Recently our State Department has affirmed its recognition of the
absence of any right to interfere in the internal commercial activities
of another country. In connection with recent attempts to persuade
foreign buyers of American scrap to eliminate restrictive and discriminatory practices, it has said:
The measures which can be taken to implement our policy of discouraging restrictive business arrangements and encouraging competitive
enterprise are subject to two important limitations. First, rapid and
dramatic results cannot be expected in this field, because we are dealing
with methods of doing business and a whole pattern of thinking that has
become engrained over scores of years. The process of change can
therefore only be gradual. Second, we cannot interfere in the internal
affairs of other sovereign nations, and it would certainly defeat our aims
to do so. We can only encourage and assist where this is desired. 20
Any other approach, if persisted in, would surely cause chaos. In
the circumstances with which the State Department was here dealing, the European Coal and Steel Community had, in the one case,
authorized private consumers to combine for purposes of foreign buying and imports of iron and steel scrap and Japan had, in the other,
authorized a private group to handle virtually all buying of scrap
for import into Japan. In both cases there were antitrust laws in
effect which would prohibit restrictive combinations among competitors.2 1 In the case of the European Coal and Steel Community however,
the joint buying was expressly authorized as an exception to the antitrust prohibitions and in the other presumably some similar exemption was granted.
But even if such combinations were not expressly authorized by
foreign governments, it is hardly conceivable that they could be prosecuted in this country without opening the door to serious conflicts. The
mere fact that such conflicts can arise demonstrates the existence of
territoriality and the force of Judge Altamira's observation in the
Lotus case that to accept the right of every State to apply its own
penal law extra-territorially without obtaining the consent of other
States concerned,
territory and that decisions of other states, including decisions by courts,
shall not apply .... The Netherlands has its own legislation controlling economic competition, which are suited to Netherlands economic conditions ....
The Netherlands Government has taken and will take such action as it deems
proper to insure that its own laws and policies are carried out with respect
to economic competition within the sovereignty of the Netherlands." Id., Attachment IV, second supplemental affidavit of John F. Sonnett, 27 September,
1957.
20. Kalijarvi, Problems Relating to Export of Iron and Steel Scrap 122-27,
DEP'T STATE BuLL. (July 15, 1957).
21. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, arts. 65-66,
I EUROPEAN YEAREOOK 397-405 (Council of Europe, 1955); Osakadani, Javan,
ANvi-TRusT LAws, A COMPARAT
SYmposium 238-57 (Friedmann ed. 1956).
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would in my opinion, be to neglect one of the fundamental conditions of
the international community and would result in opening the door to conflicts which might involve most undesirable consequences 2
The confusion and disorder that would come about were every
antitrust law of the world, and every law allowing freedom from
antitrust restraints, to operate within the territories of all nations
wherever effects or consequences could be shown is obvious. As Story
would say, "The absurd results of such a state of things need not be
dwelt upon."2 No such obliteration of territoriality can have been
contemplated by the court in the Lotus case either in recognizing an
objective application of the territorial principle in that case or the
absence of international law restraints on extraterritorial applications
of penal law that do not encounter prohibitive rules. On the contrary the exclusive right of each State to regulate its own internal
affairs was expressly affirmed.

FOREIGN

A=TITRUST LEGISLATION

No attempt will be made here to review all foreign legislation on
this subject. What follows is limited to the laws of European countries
and to the attitude of these countries in regard to extraterritorial
applications.
A variety of circumstances has led to an active development
in Europe since the war. The impact of American occupation
authorities, the competition of American business and post-war American antitrust decisions have undoubtedly stimulated interest, but the
main impetus has come from the intense struggle of the European
economies to restore and modernize their own production and trade.
Restrictive practices that had operated unchallenged for long periods
have been and are being tested against drives for efficiency and
greater productivity. Business itself sees the need for greater freedom
and recognizes that dynamic competitive enterprise is the strongest
bulwark against socialism.24
It has long been the policy of our government to encourage these
developments and to assist other nations in their efforts to deal with
problems of restrictions on production and trade. Missions from abroad
to study our antitrust laws and their administration, the constitution
of the European Productivity Agency and the opportunities which
this has afforded for exchanges of ideas and experience, the negotia22. See note 10 supra.
23. See note 2 supra.

24. HUTTON, WE Too CAN PROSPER
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 11, 84 (British

194-96 (1953);

PRoDUcTIVITY

REPORT,

Productivity Council 1954); BRITAIN'S
INDUSTRIAL FUTURE 11 (British Employers' Confederation 1955); van Themaat,
Netherlands, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE SYMPosrum 268 (Friedmann
ed. 1956). Similar evidence is available in respect of other countries.
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tion of treaty provisions, and occasional diplomatic action have all
contributed to the greater understanding of this subject.25
At the same time, not one of the recent laws in Europe has followed
the pattern of our Sherman Act. The nearest approaches are the new
German law and the Common Market Treaty, but basic prohibitions
are extensively qualified in the former by exceptions and in the latter
by provisions for exemptions. Here and in other communities administrative agencies are established to investigate and evaluate the harm
that restrictive practices or monopolies may do to the common good.
The emphasis is on removing harmful effects rather than on the application of legal norms. Only in the United Kingdom has it been decided to leave the application of the law to judges, but even there they
are assisted by lay experts and on questions of fact their votes may
be outnumbered. Despite long and thorough study of our methods,
the British parliament rejected penal legislation of the Sherman Act
type and evolved an approach all its own. This will first be briefly considered.
THE LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN

As the British law is dealt with elsewhere in this symposium,2 it is
enough here to contrast its general approach with that of the Sherman
Act and to consider briefly its territorial limitations.
In its Report on Collective Discrimination in June 1955 the Monopolies Commission proposed that the restrictive practices there considered should be generally prohibited and a new criminal offence
created.27 In moving the Report generally as a basis for formulating
legislative proposals, the Lord Chancellor objected as follows to this
particular aspect:
I do not think that the establishment of new criminal offences is a
suitable or right method of dealing with this sphere of activity . . .
[M]any of the practices which are condemned in the Majority Report
came into existence at a time when they could be justified on economic
grounds, to protect the industries from the difficulties of the slump ...
It may well be ... that they have been continued into times when the
economic justification no longer applies, but the point I am making ... is
that there is nothing inherently criminal in this . . . [I]t is clearly better
to deal with [these practices] as a civil matter, by injunction, rather than
as a criminal offence.... [T]hese are essentially economic and commercial
problems, and . . . questions of ethics arise only incidentally....
I believe that every country should evolve its own method of dealing with
these difficulties....
I believe that the British method, the method that
suits our country best, is that of inquiry into the facts of the practices,
25. KAL.TARVI, supranote 20, at 126.
26. See Morrison, Commercial Restrictions in English Law, 11
REv. 1 (1957).

VAND.

L.

27. A REPORT ON ExCLusIvE DEALING, COLLECTIVE BOYCOTTS, AGGREGATED REBATES AND OTHER DISCRnnINATORY TRADE PRACTICES 86, cmd. 9504 (1955).
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as to whether or not they are in the public interest, and after that, for
practicable action to be taken to deal with them. (Emphasis added.)28
This view was also expressed in the House of Commons 9 and was
adopted by Parliament in passing a law which, except in the case of
agreements for the collective enforcement of conditions as to resale
prices, avoids prohibiting particular practices as such, and even in the
case excepted expressly provides that no criminal proceedings shall
lie against persons who do what is declared to be unlawful. 30 The
Sherman Act appoach was expressly rejected. 31
The Labor Party's forceful plea for a lay tribunal responsible to a
Government Minister or to Parliament was also rejected 32 and the
28. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, HousE OF LoRDs, 193 HANSARD No. 23, July 27,
1955, cols. 1090-91, 1096. These reports are cited as "HANsARD, H.L." and
the corresponding reports for the House of Commons as 'IANSARD,

H.C."

29. Thorneycroft, the President of the Board of Trade, said: "These practices in one form or another are all practices in restraint of trade, and as such
they are of their nature liable at any rate to operate against the public interest.
The answer seems to me not to declare them crimes or fix an arbitrary date
at which all practices must stop . . .but to place the onus of showing that

they are in the public interest in a particular case fairly and squarely on
the shoulders of the men who wish to use them." HANSARD, H.C., July 13,

1955, col. 1946. Sir Lionel Heald added "We dislike the multiplication of criminal offences... [and] the creation of anything which might be described as
an absolute or automatic offence" and he referred to the "strange conception"
of the Monopolies Commission "that one should establish a certain course of
action as a crime and afterwards allow people to apply for exemption." He
said the rule of reason under the Sherman Act had "produced the most magnificent lawyers' jamboree in the whole of history." Id. at cols. 1971, 1973.
In concluding the debates in the House of Lords a year later, the Government
spokesman (Lord Mancroft) said: 'ashould like to emphasise again that
there is no odour of criminality attaching to restrictive practices." HANsARD,
H.L., July 26, 1956, col. 335. The Opposition spokesman (Douglas Jay) said
that the Government "made a profound mistake in rejecting the main proposal of the Monopolies Commission that there should be a general prohibition of the worst type of practices." HANSARD, H.C., June 14, 1956, col. 896.
30. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 ELIz. 2, c.68, § 24(6).
31. At an early stage a spokesman for the Labor Party, Harold Wilson,
said: "The approach of the Labour Government to this problem is well known
to the House. We rejected the American approach and the Conservative Party
joined with us." His proposal was to follow the Swedish pattern: "Let us
have these associations registered .... Let us show up these men who '.
loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil.' Let us bring
them into the daylight." He urged that certain practices be banned. The
Government rejected this: "The American Sherman Act procedure would
be bitterly controversial in all parties." HANSARD, H. C., February 24, 1955, cols.
1472, 1486-87, 1499.
32. The Party's spokesman on this issue said: "The Bill hands over to this
court governmental and parliamentary power. All judgments are founded
upon law or upon facts, but in this case the decision which really matters will
be a decision founded neither upon law nor upon fact. It will be a political
and economic decision. The true place of public interest in law is as the
foundation and reason for a general rule, which the law then applies. It is
not for a judge to conceive what, in all the circumstances, he considers the
public interest to be. That is not law; it is the negation of law. . . . What
the court has to do ... is, without limitation and without definition, to decide
whether or not the agreement is in the public interest. That is not a function of the court at all. That is a decision of economic policy which should
be taken by the Minister, or by the Executive, and for which they should be
responsible to Parliament. . . . There is no definition of public interest-
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more American pattern of having legal issues decided by professional
judges adopted. What are innovations of the greatest importance are,
first, the combination of two lay experts and one judge, each of whom
has an equal vote on questions of fact, in a court having the dignity
and standing of the High Court of Justice 33 and, second, the duty of this
court to decide ultimately whether or not particular arrangements
which come before it are reasonable having regard to the "balance"
between the circumstances stated in the Act, and established by the
parties, and any detriment to the public or others resulting or likely
to result from their operation. 34
In view of these and other characteristics of this law, it must surely
be improper for any other country to apply its own antitrust law
to the operation of restrictive practices in the United Kingdom. It is
conceivable that an agreement among British companies to fix prices or
limit production might produce harmful effects on the foreign commerce of such other country and that it might be argued that the case
thus falls within the objective territorial theory; but it would be unthinkable that such companies should be prosecuted under the foreign
law in regard to arrangements which did not operate in such other
country and which were found by the British court to be in the interests of the public in the United Kingdom where they did operate.3
The greatest care has been exercised in the provisions of the new
law and by the Monopolies Commission in its own proceedings to
observe the limitations of territoriality. Thus, the law itself applies
only where at least two of the parties are carrying on business in the
United Kingdom in the production or supply of goods or in the application to goods of a process of manufacture. 36 Although neither of
these parties have to be bound by the restrictions binding other parties
there is no general rule laid down, and no law laid down that a court of law
can apply ....
What this is dealing with is a decision under an oak tree-the
judge dealing with each case separately, without a general rule of law to

apply at all. Therefore, that fundamental consideration that law must be
general and impartial is missing ....
We do not by submitting what are essentially political matters to the decision of a court turn them into legal
matters.... It is in fact the height of folly to drag the judges into these matters." Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas, HANSARD, H. C., March 6, 1956, cols. 2042-45.
33. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Euz. 2, c.68, § 2, schedule,
para. 5. The decision of the court on a question of fact is final but an appeal
will lie on any question of law, in the case of England, to the Court of Appeal.
When sitting in public in London, the court sits at the Royal Court of Justice.
Id., schedule, para. 2, 7.
34. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Etaz. 2, c.68, § 21.
35. In many of its investigations the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission found that restrictive arrangements were not contrary to the
public interest. For example, it approved a scheme operated by tea brokers'
and tea producers' associations in London regulating sales of tea on the

London Market, even though this might have some effect on prices. There
was some evidence that "the present system benefits the smaller buyer." It
considered the scheme "a reasonable and practical measure." REPORT ON THE
SUPPLY OF TEA 40, 41 (September 20, 1956).
36. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956 4 & 5 Euz. 2, c.68, §§ 6, 24.
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abroad, 37 the fact that two of the parties are within British territory
prima facie localizes the arrangement there. In reply to efforts by
the Labor Party to provide that only one party need be carrying on
business in the country for the law to attach, the Government said
they did not wish in this way to fetter "a very normal trading practice" whereby individual traders in the United Kingdom might enter
into arrangements with firms abroad "which are to some extent
restrictive but which bring valuable returns to this country." He
added that the American practice had been very harmful to business.8
Apart from the requirement that two parties must be carrying on
business within the territorial limits of the United Kingdom, there are
specific exclusions of restrictions which relate exclusively to exports,
to production and manufacture abroad, to the acquisition of goods to
be delivered abroad and not imported for home use and to the supply
of goods to be delivered abroad otherwise than by export from
the United Kingdom. 9 Moreover, where the new court finds that
registered agreements are contrary to the public interest, its jurisdiction to restrain parties from giving effect to or enforcing the restrictions thus condemned only extends to parties who carry on business
in the United Kingdom. 4° Finally, the provision relating to collective
resale price maintenance relates specifically not only to persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom but also to the delivery of
'41
goods there and to "domestic proceedings.
It is thus apparent that the greatest care has been exercised to confine the operation of this law, notwithstanding its non-criminal character, to the territory of the United Kingdom and, by the limitations
imposed on the jurisdictional competence of the new court, to avoid
conflicts with foreign jurisdictions. 42
37. WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL AND ELLES, op. cit. supranote 16, at 216-17.
38. "The American practice was cited, but it is pertinent to observe, that at
this moment evidence is being given before a Senate committee in the United
States showing the damage which she is suffering because these agreements...
are subject to inquiry in America. We do not want to fall into the same error."
Thorneycroft, HANsARD, H. C., April 26, 1956, cols. 2040-41. (Emphasis added.)
The President of the Board of Trade had in mind the hearings reported in
A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB-CoMIVITTEE

ANTITRUST AND

MONOPOLY

(1955).

ON

For the effects on American business

abroad of current antitrust policies, see id. at 1851-1904; FOREIGN TRADE CON-

(1955); and THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (Am. Ch. of Commerce in London, 1955).
FERENCES, STAFF MEMORANDUM

39. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Euz. 2, c.68 § 8 (8).
40. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 EuIz. 2, c.68 § 20 (3).
'"Members will remember that we agreed that purely overseas trading arrangements were not restrictions on exports and imports and should not be
included." Thorneycroft, HANSARD, H. C., June 13, 1956, col. 711. "It is no
good imagining that the Court can issue an injunction against a foreign person
who has entered into restrictions.. ." Id. at col. 715.
41. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eiz. 2, c.68, § 24.
42. The English courts have criticized conflicts arising from the extraterritorial operation of American court orders. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1953] Ch. 19 (C. A.). See Kahn-Freund,
English Contracts and American Anti-Trust Law The Nylon Patent Case,
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NETHERLANDS LAW

The antitrust law recently adopted in the Netherlands 43 had its
origin in a law of 193544 where the government had been given powers
not only to nullify agreements which restricted competition and were
found to be against the public interest but also to declare "generally
binding" throughout an industry the terms of restrictive arrangements
adopted by a predominant part of its members. This latter aspect has
a parallel in our own NRA legislation, but the principle was not abandoned with the return of prosperity. As the Netherlands Government
has recently said:
The fundamental principle of the Act of 1935 is still accepted by the
government as correct. This principle is that too much restriction of
economic life and too great a freedom are both detrimental to the welfare. It is therefore essential that the authorities should have the
authority to support cooperation between undertakings where it has a
favorable effect and that it should be able to nullify such cooperation
where it is harmful to the general interest. It certainly cannot be contended that all arrangements between undertakings which regulate
competition are undesirable; on the contrary, they may be extremely
useful, not only for those immediately concerned but for the general interest as well . . . they may counteract the squandering of capital and
promote national production. They need not operate to the deriment of
the consumer. But, equally, it cannot be contended that the Government
must under all circumstances acquiesce in whatever the business world
wishes to make binding on itself.45
During the war the law was superseded by the Cartel Decree of
1941, but there was little occasion to apply this Decree during the occupation and the period of controls, and for some time after the war
the general dearth of goods obviated the need for restrictive arrangements. 46 With the reappearance of cartels from 1948 onwards, there
was increasing pressure for more permanent and effective legislation 4 7
The 1956 law provides for the compulsory registration of "competitive arrangements," which are defined as agreements and decisions
"regulating economic competition between owners of undertakings."
This requirement is not new, but it is more comprehensive than the
18 MODERN L. REv. 65 (1955); cf. Radio Corp. v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 All.
E.R. 549.
43. Economic Competition Law, 28th June 1956, STAATSBLAD 1956 No. 401
(Netherlands).
44. Business Agreements Law, 24th May 1935, STAATSBLAD 1935 No. 310,

amended

STAATSBLAD

1939 No. 639-Y (Netherlands).

45. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM § 1, sub. 1, submitted by eight Ministers
to the Second Chamber in explanation of the draft Economic Competition Bill,
Session 1953-54, 3295, No. 3 [hereinafter ExPLAN. MEMO.].
46. Wijsen, Cartel Legislation in the Netherlands. 6 Cartel 110 (Oct. 1956).
47. For a review of proceedings from 1945 to 1955 see Annex II to the
MV-EMORANDUM OF REPLY OF 13TH APRI,
1955, submitted by eight Ministers
of the Government to the Second Chamber, Session 1954-55, 3295, No. 7
[hereinafter MEMO. REPLY].
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corresponding provision in the Cartel Decree, and the law may be
declared applicable to arrangements which are not legally binding but
which regulate competition or "exert an influence on such competition."
Although it is not expected that there will be much call for the
exercise of the power to declare arrangements "generally binding,"
it is recognized that the economic situation may change and occasions
may arise, as was the case before the war, where "uncontrolled competition" may lead to "economic dislocation" and "regulation of market
relations may be necessary in order to avoid disastrous developments
in a particular branch of industry." 48 Before this provision can be
invoked, however, it must appear that the number or the combined
sales of the parties involved in the arrangement is "considerably
larger" than the number of sales of others in the same sector of industry, and, that the "general interest" requires, in the opinion of the
Ministers, that the declaration be made.
Before any declaration of "generally binding" or "non-binding" can
be made, the Minister is required to take the advice of the Economic
Competition Committee, a body composed of not less than twelve members appointed by the Crown, each for a period of six years. It is not
provided that the members of this Committee shall represent any particular groups or interests. On the contrary, it has been stressed that
they are to act solely as "objective experts" and the function of the
Committee is to advise the Minister of Economic Affairs. 49 Whenever
the Committee is called upon for advice, it is required to hold a public
hearing of all interested parties. Conduct tending towards conformity
with an arrangement which has been declared non-binding is prohibited for a period of five years and a deliberate breach of such a prohibition is a criminal offense.
As in the case of the British law, the Government stressed the
absence of any legal norms governing anti-competitive arrangements
and took the position that this was not a fit subject for prohibitory or
criminal legislation. It was said that the aim is not to punish, but to
bring about "a change in the behavior of a cartel," thereby "removing
the conflict with the general interest."50
On the whole, the Government considers its task to be one of promoting healthy competition which will help economic expansion or combat
economic stagnation . .. [T]he problem is always one of encountering
conflicts between the aims or operation of the various forms of economic
power and the aims of the Government's social and economic policy....
It is not a question of punishing individual acts which are at variance

with norms established by law, but of bringing arrangements which
48. See note 45 supra.

49. REPORT OF ORAL DiscussioN SESSION 1955-1956, 3295, No. 18, ans. to Q. 15.
50. ExPLAx. MEMO., supra note 45, § 2, sub. 3.
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themselves frequently apply to a large number of individuals into line
with the general interest. (Emphasis added.) 51
And at a later stage, the Ministers said:
The Government's primary task is to create the conditions necessary
for healthy competition to exist... [I]t is not intended that the present
Bill should have the character of prohibitory legislation ....52
This is legislation "without fixed and clear legal norms" and in 99.5 percent of the cases decisions will be founded on the judgment of a Minister and he in turn will base his judgment "on his views concerning
the organization and functioning of the economic process and on the
53
economic policy as a whole."
There are also provisions relating to "concentrations of economic
power." After taking- the advice of the Economic Competition Committee, which shall hear interested parties, the Ministers may publish
relevant information, may impose obligations to refrain from certain
conduct and to supply goods or render services on prescribed terms
and may regulate prices and terms of goods and services. In the Explanatory Memorandum it was pointed out that such concentrations
might take the form of a single undertaking or of informal, nonenforceable arrangements or of mere "interrelated conduct". Later,
in the replies to questions, the Ministers emphasized:
It is definitely not the case that every large concern constitutes a
concentration of economic power simply because it is a large concern;
everything depends on its strength in the market.
Even more than in the case of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands
approach to antitrust is pragmatic and there are not even presumptions
created against particular practices. Moreover, not only is the application of the law left to Government departments, but decisions regarding the general interest are to be made by Ministers on the advice
of the Committee.
Although the territorial scope of the law is not defined, it is subject
to the overriding limitation of Section 2 of the Criminal Code which
confines the "criminal law of the Netherlands" to criminal acts "within
the Realm in Europe." The Government specifically rejected the approach of the American courts in applying the law to all arrangements
abroad "which have consequences for the economic life of the Netherlands." It was considered that "this would involve an extension of
the rule of Section 2 of the Criminal Code," which was considered undesirable, and would also conflict with article 34 referred to below:
51. MEMo. REPLY, supra note 47, General
52. REPORT, supra note 49, reply to Q. 4.

53. Id. reply to Q. 7.
54. Id. reply to Q. 5.

Observations, § 1.
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For it to be possible to apply the Netherlands law there must, -inour
view, have been concrete acts on Netherlands territory. 55
During the debates in the Second Chamber, however, the bill was
amended to provide that competitive arrangements "which do not
regulate economic competition in the Netherlands" may be exempted
from registration and this has been interpreted to mean that in other
respects the law may apply subject to the limitations of the Criminal
Code and international law. The bill was also amended to define "concentration of economic power" as a concern "which involves a dominating influence on a market for goods or services in the Netherlands." 56
Upon ratification of the Common Market Treaty the scope of this
law will be substantially reduced. As pointed out below, there is
confusion regarding the proper application of the Treaty during the
period prior to the adoption of regulations. Whatever the proper interpretation may be, the mandate of the Treaty is clear that both the
Netherlands law and the provisions of the Treaty itself are to apply to
arrangements "likely to affect trade between Member States.' In such
cases, not only will the "general interest" of the Netherlands have to
be considered but the effect also of the arrangements on the common
57
market generally.
The Government's concern with attempts by other States to interfere with its own efforts to regulate restrictive arrangements is evidenced by article 34 of the law. This forbids compliance "with
measures or decisions taken by another state and relating to competitive arrangements, concentrations of economic power or conduct
in restraint of competition" and appears to have had its origin in
attempts by United States authorities to obtain adherence by Netherlands companies to court orders and subpoenas under the Sherman
Act. As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum with reference to
what was then designated section 30:
Since the fundamental principles of Netherlands cartel legislation,
together with concrete decisions by the Netherlands Authorities on
questions of cartel policy, must in principle be decisive in this matter
as regards the conduct of business and industry on Netherlands territory,
it is laid down in Section 30 that decisions by other States on questions of
cartel policy-including decisions by judicial bodies of such States-may
not voluntarily be complied with. Even in cases where such decisions
by other States, under which, for example, Netherlands undertakings
on Netherlands territory might be compelled to perform certain acts,
are in themselves lawful under international law, they may come into
conflict with the laws of the Netherlands, which here too must be decisive.
Cases are, however, conceivable in which there can be no question of any
55. MEMO. REPLY, supra note 47, General Observations, § 3.
56. First Chamber, Session 1955-56, 3295, No. 187a, pp. 2, 3. For a discussion
in Holland of the territorial principle. See WEEBERS, CONTROLE OP INTERNATIONALE. KARTELS 29-41 (Zwolle).
57. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art. 88.
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conflict with international law or with substantive or adjective principles of Netherlands law, and in which at most there can be said to be a
desirability of co-ordination between the cartel policy of the Netherlands and that of other Powers. In view of these possibilities, the Ministers are empowered to grant exemption from the ban. The question
whether there are any grounds for making use of these powers will on the
whole have to be reviewed from case to case.58
The law is not yet in operation as further legislation is required in
regard to appeals from Ministerial declarations and orders. It is expected that this further legislation will be passed during 1958.

THE LAW OF FRANCE
In France basic prohibitions against concerted or individual manipulations of price by artificial or fraudulent means have long been in
existence,59 but these criminal provisions have been largely ineffective,
partly because of the difficulties involved in proving the necessary
intent of fraud, and partly because the authorities have not been sup60
plied with adequate funds and other means of proper enforcement.
Notwithstanding the hostility of public opinion and official circles,
measures were adopted by the legislature in 1953 and 1954 for dealing
with the problem of restrictive practices, largely as the result of a
growing conviction that these were an obstacle to the economic
recovery of France. In the formulation of this legislation, there was,
on the one hand, strong opposition to any attempt to import the
Sherman Act into a country whose economic and social structures
differed radically from that of the United States and, on the other,
the Government opposed the criterion of public interest as too vague
a yardstick for distinguishing bad practices from good ones. 61 Nor was
58. ExPLAN. MEMO., supra note 45, Comment on § 30. In the letter from the
Netherlands Ambassador, referred to in note 19 supra, it is said:
"It is also the policy of the Netherlands Government that Netherlands companies do not comply with procedural matters relating to the enforcement of
foreign economic competition laws in areas under Netherlands sovereignty.
Specifically, Netherlands policy as codified in Section 34 of the Economic
Competition Law above referred to, prohibits Netherlands companies in the
absence of general exemption or specific authorization, from complying with
procedural Orders of the type here requested by the United States Attorney
General, calling for the exportation of documents or information from areas
under Netherlands sovereignty in connection with attempted regulation of
Netherlands economic competition by a foreign government.... In this connection the Netherlands Government has declared, in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Economic Competition Law, that such general exemption or specific authorization are to be granted at most where there can
be said to be a desirability of coordination of the cartel policy of the Netherlands and that of other Powers, always provided that there is no question of
any conflict with international law or with the substantive and procedural
principles of Netherlands law."
59. PENAL CODE, §§ 419, 420 (France). See Castel, France,ANTI-TRUST LAWS,
A ComPARATirv Symposium, 91 (Friedmann ed. 1956).
60. Castel, supranote 59 at 105, 106.
61. Id. at 119-25.
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it possible in the stress of political and economic circumstances in
1953 to do more than tack provisions for the control of restrictive
practices on to existing price regulations.
By the Decree issued on this subject in August 195362 all concerted
actions, agreements (express or implied) and combinations under
whatever form which have as their object or tend to have as their
effect the restraint of the full exercise of competition by hindering the
reduction of costs or sale prices or furthering an artificial increase in
prices are prohibited, subject to exemption where it can be shown
that the concerted action, agreement or combination has the effect
of improving and increasing markets for production or of assuring economic progress by rationalization or specialization. All
undertakings and agreements thus prohibited are null and void. A
Technical Cartel Commission is established for the purpose of examining possible violations of these provisions and of determining whether
satisfactory proof has been furnished of their justification. Although,
this Decree thus takes the form of prohibitory legislation as in the case
of the Sherman Act, the broad grounds for exemption have the effect of
creating only a presumption of illegality more along the line of the
new British law. The legislation is essentially directed at the removal
of abuses.
The Decree also provides that certain restrictive practices shall be
deemed to be "illicit practices". These include improper refusals to sell
or provide services, unjustified discriminatory treatment, and minimum reseale price maintenance not authorized by the Government;
they also include the concerted actions, agreements and combinations
referred to in the last preceding paragraph above. "Antitrust" is thus
treated as a part of a general system of price control.
As in the case of the Netherlands, the Cartel Commission is merely
an advisory body. Composed of five persons chosen from the Council
of State, the Court of Cessation and other tribunals and the Audit
Office, four from professional organizations and two from the National Productivity Committee, and presided over by a Counsellor of
State, the Commission is charged with the duty of examining possible
violations and of considering justifications. The members are chosen
by the Ministers of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Justice and the
rapporteurs who prepare reports on cases for the Commission, by the
first two of these three Ministers. The Secretary is the Director General of Prices and Economic Investigations or his representative. Investigations are undertaken by the Commission or by the Minister of
Economic Affairs, who supplies all available information to the Com62. Decree No. 53-704 of 9 August 1953, Journal Officiel (France), August
10, 1953, p. 7045.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 11

mission together with his own observations and those of interested
parties. Proceedings before the Commission are secret. After considering available evidence, the reports of rapporteurs and the observations of interested parties, the Commission gives its opinion to the
Minister who then makes the final decision whether or not to refer the
matter to the public prosecutor.6
It is claimed by the French Government that this approach to the
problem is unique as it does not outlaw all cartels but establishes procedures for dealing with harmful practices and influences on prices
and refers the examination of cases to an independent body which has
the duty to advise the Government on the measures required to restore
competition. 64 This approach is not, however, dissimilar to that
adopted in the United Kingdom in 1948 and later in the Netherlands,
as in all these cases a commission of experts is established for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts, formulating conclusions and giving
advice to the appropriate Minister of the Government.
Such a method of dealing with restrictive practices proved unsatisfactory in England, however, as it failed to obtain the confidence of
industry, and the examination of individual cases was slow. 65 Moreover, the British Government concluded that the task of deciding on
the disposition of individual cases was too great for any Ministry and
the only satisfactory solution was to put the matter into the hands
of an independent court.66 It will be interesting to see what the result
will be of the French approach.
Although territorial limitations are not written into the French
legislation, the Government's official circular on the provisions relating
to combinations refers to the "territorial principle of the penal law
and to principles of international law." 67 There is no indication in the
Decree or the Penal Law that these provisions apply to arrangements
made abroad which do not operate in France. Presumably, the position
of France on this question is as stated by Judge Weiss in the Lotus
case 68 and as indicated by protests against American grand jury sub69
poenas which attempt to reach documents in France.
63. Id., art. 1, 2; Decree No. 54-97 January 27, 1954, Journal Officiel (France),
January 28, 1954; Castel, supra note 59, at 128-31.
64. Circular No. 65, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 31, 1954.
65. HANSARD, H. C., April 12, 1956, cols. 446, 487.
66. Id. cols. 411-12.
67. Circular No. 65, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 31, 1954.
"There is not space here to examine the principles of international law which
can extend the application in space of penal provisions." Article 7 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure provides that foreigners may be prosecuted in France
for the commission abroad of crimes "prejudicial to the security of the
State" or of counterfeiting. By inference other "crimes" committed by
foreigners abroad are not within the reach of French law.
68. See note 7 supra.
69. The French Government forbade the production of documents in France
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WEST GERmANY LAW

The new Cartel Law in West Germany 0 has been described as "one
of the most controversial economic laws there has ever been."'71 The
original bill was submitted in May, 1952, and has been the subject of
intense study and debate ever since. The law was finally passed by
the Bundestag on July 4, 1957, and becomes effective on January 1,
1958, superseding eleven Allied laws and ordinances and thirteen
pre-war laws and ordinances.
Article I prohibits all agreements and resolutions "insofar as they
tend to affect the production or the market conditions for trade in
goods or commercial services by restricting competition." This basic
prohibition, to which the Minister of Economics held fast through long
periods of debate, was adopted in preference to a prohibition of cartel
practices having harmful effects. At the same time the exceptions to
this broad proscription are themselves so wide as to make it extremely
uncertain what effect the law will have on cartel practices. Thus,
agreements and restrictions are excluded which:
(a) are designed to establish the uniform application of general
terms of business, supply and payment other than those having
to do with price-fixing and price-calculation (Article 2);
(b) are concerned with supply rebates insofar as they represent
genuine recompense for services rendered and will not lead to
unjustified discriminations (Article 3);
(c) would otherwise fall under the general prohibition but which
the Cartel Authorities permit production and processing enterprises to establish because of a drop in sales due to a long-term
shift in demand (Article 4) ;
(d) the Cartel Authorities permit where the object is "the rationalization of industrial processes" and which are "likely to result
in a considerable improvement in the productivity and/or
profitability of the enterprises concerned from a technical point
of view, from that of economy in operation or from that of
organization, and thereby to bring about an improvement in
meeting demand" (Article 5);
in the grand jury investigation of the foreign oil industry. See In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, lisc. No. 19-52, D.D.C., Dec. 15,
1952, Tr. 730. A protest has also been made in connection with the recent

issue of subpoenas in a grand jury investigation in the Southern District of
New York of possible violations of the antitrust laws in the radio-television

industry.

70. Law Against Restrictive Trade Practices of 28th July, 1957 (Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen) (Germany), Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 41,
Aug. 9, 1957.
71. The Main Provisions of the Cartel Bill, HANELSBLATT No. 73, June 26,

1957 (Germany).
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(e) have for their purpose "securing and furthering the export
trade if they are restricted to regulating competition in markets
outside" the area of applicability of the law, but this is subject
to overriding limitations in international agreements and to
avoiding appreciable restrictions on domestic competition (Article 6);
(f) the Cartel Authorities permit in respect of imports into the area
of applicability of the law where the importer encounters little
or no competition on the part of domestic suppliers (Article 7);
and
(g) the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs permits where the
restriction on competition is necessary for the economy as a
whole and for the common good and outweighs other considerations (Article 8).
It is apparent that there are broad avenues for escape and that much
will depend upon the attitude of the Cartel Authority and of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs. The Authority will be autonomous,
but will operate under the auspices of the Ministry, and appeals from
its decisions will lie to the courts.
Collective resale price arrangements are "null and void," but this
provision does not apply to branded goods which are in competition
with similar goods of other manufacturers or dealers nor to publications, but details of branded goods must be notified to the Federal Cartel Office. This Authority is required to nullify and prohibit resale price
maintenance arrangements where it finds that the conditions justifying
such maintenance no longer apply, or the maintenance is being abused,
or it is likely to make the goods more expensive than market conditions justify or to prevent a drop in price or to limit their production or
sale. Restrictions on the use, acquisition or supply of goods and
services which are regarded as "unfair" by the Cartel Authority
and for which there is "no reasonable compensating consideration"
may be declared in valid and patent restrictions are invalid, with certain exceptions, which reach beyond the protective scope of the patent.
Where a business enterprise has no competitors or is subject to no
appreciable competition it is deemed to dominate the market and
thereby becomes subject to the powers of the Cartel Authority to
prohibit practices and to nullify agreements which give rise to abuses.
These provisions also apply to two or more business enterprises where
there is no appreciable competition between them and which together
dominate the market with respect to particular goods or services.
Economic and professional associations are allowed to draw up rules
of fair competition for their members so as to eliminate practices
which are not in accord with principles of fair competition.
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The Federal Cartel Office has jurisdiction over Emergency Cartels
(Article 4), Export Cartels (Article 6) and Import Cartels (Article
7), resale maintenance agreements relating to branded goods (Article
16), enterprises dominating the market and mergers (Articles 22, 23
and 24), and all restrictions extending beyond a Land's territory;
the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs over exemptions under
Article 8; and in all other cases the competent Land Authority established by Land legislation. The Federal Cartel Office is an independent Federal higher authority but it forms part of the functional
sphere of the Minister for Economic Affairs.
Although in form prohibitory legislation, this law contains so many
exceptions and such broad powers are given to the authorities that it
is in effect, like other European legislation, a measure for the control
and regulation of abuses.
At this writing, the extraterritorial application of the law is not
clear. Apparently it applies to foreign arrangements only if they are
"effective" within German territory72 and the Report of the Parliamentary Committee which accompanied the final version of the Bill
said that action under this provision would depend upon whether
foreign parties participated in such arrangements through representatives within Federal territory, whether such parties are subject
to the jurisdiction in accordance with applicable principles of international law or whether German law is applicable. 3

THE LAWS OF NORwAY, SWEDEN AND

DENMARK

In all three of these Scandinavian countries the regulation of restrictive practices and monopolies is in the hands of Government commissions rather than the courts, and in both Norway and Denmark
regulation is closely allied to price controls. In every case the standard
is that of reasonableness and the public interest. Only in Norway is
there penal legislation, but the law there is so comprehensive that it
is more in the nature of a general control of business law than one
specifically directed at cartels7 4
72. Note 70, supra, Art. 98.
73. Published by Verlag Handelsblatt G.m.b.H., Dusseldorf.
74. For a review of the legislation in Norway see Eckhoff, Norway, ANTiTRUST LAWS, A ComPARATm SYmPosiUm 281 (Friedmann ed. 1956). For the
Swedish laws see Bolin, Sweden, id. at 319: these laws should be cited as the
Law of 25 September 1953 to Counteract Certain Cases of Restraint of Trade
Within the National Economy and the Law of 1 June 1956 Respecting Duty
to Furnish Information on Facts Regarding Prices and Competition, the latter
replacing the law of June 29, 1946, referred to by Bolin as "the Act of 1946"
(he refers to the former as "the Act of 1954"). The law in Denmark is Law
No. 102 of 31st March 1955. On this law see Banke, Restrictive Practices
Danish Legislation, 6 CARTEL 83 (July 1956).
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In the administration of all three systems there appears to be a
considerable degree of tolerance. While, in the case of Sweden, the
threat exists that, if industry does not conform to a reasonable competitive pattern, stronger legislation may be introduced making certain
practices crimes, there does not appear to be much difficulty in negotiating reasonable adjustments.75 And even in Norway, where the
law in terms is drastic and the Government has broad powers to impose further regulations, the emphasis has been on removing particular
abuses rather than attempting to establish that certain types of prac6
tice are uniformly bad.7
In Sweden prohibitions are limited to those directed against resale
price maintenance and collaboration in making tenders for the supply
of goods or services, and they are subject to Free Trade Council approval. In Denmark, there are also prohibitions against resale price
maintenance where the Control Authority does not give its consent,
but in other cases the Control Authority must find that a particular
practice results or may result in unreasonable prices or business terms
or unreasonably restricts the freedom to do business. The more elaborate machinery in Norway is similar in this respect, as consents may
be required for some forms of restrictive arrangements and in the
absence of such consents they are void. There are also broad powers
in Norway for the removal of restraints which are "likely to be harmful to production, distribution or other business conditions within the
realm" or which "must be regarded as otherwise unreasonable or
harmful to the public interest"; for the prohibition of forms of coercion
and discrimination which are deemed "to harm the public interest or
have an unreasonable effect"; for the quashing or reducing of private
penalties which are "against the public interest" or are "unfair";
and for the issuance of "regulations governing prices, dividends and
71
business conditions."
Even in Norway, however, the administration of these laws appears
to be marked by a temperate exercise of the powers granted. Thus,
restrictions on new entries into a line of business have been upheld
where they are based on professional competence and initial capital
requirements but not where they are arbitrary; refusals by dominant
enterprises to do business with particular dealers have not been interfered with; boycotts against dealers handling the products of
foreign concerns have been given full support; and in the depression
years the Price Board brought the members of one industry together
for the purpose of negotiating restrictions on competition. At the
same time, there have been controls of private pricing arrangements,
75. Bolin, supra note 74, at 324, 332, 339. This might be compared with
our own procedure for negotiating consent decrees.
76. Eckhoff, supra note 74, at 282, 306.
77. Id. at 289-92, 294.
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and'in some cases prohibitions, refusals to sanction market divisions,
and a large number of proceedings involving individual firms, associations and agreements. 8 In Denmark and Sweden,' the emphasis is
on making restrictive arrangements public and negotiating the removal of restraints. Except in the two instances already mentioned,
the Swedish law does not provide for coercive measures where restrictions are found to have harmful effects. On the other hand, the
Monopoly Control in Denmark is required to order the removal of
harmful restraints which are not disposed of by legislation, even
to the extent of direfting sales to spebified buyers on usual terms
where restrictions on the freedom to do business have been found
to be unreasonable.
In all three of these countries, therefore, restraints on competition
and free trade are subject to active controls, the criterion in each case
being what is reasonable in the particular circumstances for the community concerned. The method in each case is pragmatic rather than
doctrinaire. Foreign law could no more deal with the matter of arrangements operating in these countries than the particular Price
Board, Free Trade Council or Monopoly Control could determine what
is the public interest in some foreign country. In each case laissez faire
standards of free trade for many years survived, In varying degrees,
various forms of control. There has been wide experience in dealing
with depressions, wartime occupation, postwar shortages and current
inflation. In each case the regulation of these matters is part of the
larger subject of maintaining a vigorous and healthy economy within
the territorial limits of the nation concerned.
The Danish law refers to competition in Denmark, excludes the
Faroe Islands and stipulates that the law may be applied to Greenland, with appropriate modifications, by Royal Decree. Foreign concerns may be required to report their restrictive arrangements to the
Norwegian authorities provided that they have Norwegian representatives or there are parties in Norway. It is not clear how far this
or any of the other laws may reach out to foreign arrangements which
have effects within the country. In Sweden the criminal code provides
that it shall relate to crimes committed in Sweden and that its
application to crimes abroad shall be left to the King in Council.79
This recognizes that the extraterritorial application of penal law is a
political matter to be conducted by the responsible officials of the
nation in accordance with the law governing the relations among
States.
THE EuROPEMx CommoN MARKET

The antitrust provisions of article 85 of the European Common
78. Id. at 299-305.

79. Criminal Law, C. 1.
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Market Treaty are in some respects similar to those contained in
Article 65 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community. 80 In both cases there are broad prohibitions against agreements, decisions and concerted practices which prevent, restrict or
distort the operation of competition within the market and particular
practices are specified; and in both cases prohibited agreements are
null and void ("nuls de plein droit"). It is doubtful that the nullity of
such arrangements is intended to be more than a presumption, as the
appropriate authority may in each case grant exemption where it is
established that the management will contribute to an improvement
in production or distribution but it is by no means clear how the provisions of the Common Market Treaty will be construed. 81 There is
some resemblance to the laws in France and Germany. As in the case
of the French law, the prohibitions are broad enough to cover arrangements which have as their object or possible effect the fettering
of competition, but the Treaty goes further than this and attaches
even to those which are "likely to affect trade between Member
States." It will be difficult to find any arrangements among competitors within the six member States which do not fall within this broad
reach. As this Treaty will become law in each member State (there
is confusion as to whether the antitrust prohibitions are directives
to the member States or are rules binding on all citizens of such States)
local statutes may in time cease to have significance for any but those
arrangements having a purely local effect. In the enumeration of
offenses some are specified which are not mentioned in the Coal and
Steel Community Treaty and proof of contribution to the promotion
of technical or economic progress is added as a ground for granting
82
exemption.
80. For a French text of the former see NAUDIN, LE MARCfH COMMUN 127-239
(1957). An English translation has been published by the Coal and Steel Community. A French text and an English translation of the latter appears in I
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 359-429 (1955).
81. "Cartels are presumed guilty until proven 'innocent'; consequently they
are primafacie, forbidden." MASON, THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
62 (1955). Note, however, the contrast between the prohibitory and nullity
provisions of article 85 and the abuse provisions of article 86 of the Common
Market Treaty. If no more than a presumption were intended by article 85 it is
surprising that the nullity provisions of paragraph 2 were added to the prohibitions of 1. If 2 does not mean what it says, why was it included? If it does
mean what it says, how can an agreement which is null and void be revived if a
defense under paragraph 3 is established? A possible reconciliation of these
three paragraphs might be a deferment of the operation of 1 and 2 until after
final decision is taken under 3; but why does 3 refer back only to 1 and not also
to 2? This and other ambiguities were pointed out in the Dutch Second Chamber, Session 1956-1957, 4725, Nos. 3 and 9. It is not unlikely that in practice the
Commission will be less concerned with drafting difficulties than with arriving
at a commonsense solution in each case which will command the support of the
nations concerned. The trend is away from the traditional American antitrust
view. See CAMPS, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN POLICY, 27
(1956).

82. The following are additional: fixing purchase or sale terms other than
price (paragraph 1 (a)); limiting or controlling outlets as well as production,
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In the Coal and Steel Community Treaty controls are provided
over mergers. Any transaction which would have the effect of bringing about a concentration8 must be submitted to the High Authority
for authorization. That is to be granted if the transaction will not
produce power to determine prices, control or restrict production or
distribution or prevent effective competition in a substantial part of
the market. As Article 86 of the Common Market Treaty, on the other
hand, is directed only to the avoidance of abusive exploitation, there
are no provisions for the approval of mergers.M It is possible, however,
that merger agreements are covered by Article 85.
In the application of these provisions the Commission will be influenced by the possibility of appeals from its decisions by any person
against whom a decision has been taken or by any person directly
and individually concerned. In the case of the Coal and Steel Community appeals lie against decisions and "recommendations"; in the
Common Market Treaty it is provided that the competence of the
court relates to "the legality of the acts of the Council and of the
Commission other than recommendations or opinions (avis)." Otherwise the grounds for appeal are the same: incompetence, violation of
technical development and investments (1(b)); applying unequal terms for
equivalent benefits (1(d)); and tie-in arrangements not connected with the
object of a contract (i(e)). The specification of particular practices is
presumably not intended to limit the broad sweep of the general prohibitions.
Until rules and directives are decreed under article 87, the validity of arrangements and questions regarding the abuse of dominant positions are left by
article 88 to the authorities of the Member States "in conformity with the

law of their country and the provisions of Articles 85, notably paragraph 3,
and 86." This appears to leave the matter in a state of some confusion for
the time being. In the Netherlands a law to implement Article 88 will provide
that competitive arrangements shall be permitted, and there shall be deemed
to be no abuse of a dominating position, so long as no action has been taken
against them by the Netherlands authorities. Session 1956-1957, 4778, Nos.
2 and 3. Strong doubts have been expressed regarding the constitutionality
of this measure in view of the constitutional provision (Art. 65) that legal
provisions in force within the Kingdom shall not apply if application would
be incompatible with an international agreement which has been published.
See van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law,
47 Am. J. INT. LAw 537, 553-58 (1953). If the prohibitions contained in
Article 85 of the Treaty are immediately effective and all arrangements
thus prohibited are null and void and if these provisions have the force
of law in each member State, the greatest uncertainties regarding the validity
of restrictive arrangements will prevail. It is doubtless to avoid any such legal
chaos that governments are officially taking the position that Articles 85
and 86 operate during the initial period only to the extent provided in implementing legislation and that it was not the "intention" of the Treaty that
it should directly bind the citizens of member States. Cf. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy, 82 RECUEM DES COURS DE L' AcAnum)
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 137, 152 (1953).

83. For a definition of "concentration" see MASoN, op cit. supra note 81, at 61.
84. Mason points out that, in contrast to "cartels," concentrations under the
Coal and Steel Community Treaty are "presumed innocent unless the HA
finds that they disturb the market." Id. at 62. He points out that the framers
of the Treaty considered that concentrations were "essential in many phases
of expansion and modernization, and in general would serve to lower production costs." This philosophy is reflected in the simpler provisions of article 86
of the Common Market Treaty which "prohibits" only "abuses."
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substantial procedural requirements, violation of the Treaty or of any
rule of law relating to its application, and wrongful use of power, although the Common Market Treaty does not provide that the court
may not review an evaluation of a situation based on economic facts
and circumstances. As the granting of exemptions under paragraph
3 of Article 85 is discretionary, it may not be possible to appeal from
the denial of an application. This and other procedural matters will
be covered by regulations under Article 87 which will define, inter
atia, "the respective responsibilities of the Commission and of the
Court of Justice." 85
Whether the Commission established under the Common Market
Treaty will try to reach operations outside the Common Market which
produce harmful effects on the trade among member States is a
question which cannot now be answered. Such a step would clearly
raise questions of international law, as it would involve the agency
of one bloc of States attempting to impose its "law", derived from
the treaty creating that bloc, upon the commercial activities abroad
of the nationals of other States. Should any situation arise where,
diplomatic negotiations having failed, some action is required against
foreign restraints, presumably simple measures would be taken, such
as permitting counter combinations within the Common Market or
dealing with the matter through tariffs. It is unlikely that any such
question would ever reach the court.8
CONCLUSION

The seven countries of Europe whose antitrust laws have been ex-

amined may all be moving in the same direction of reducing restraints
on competition, but it is obvious that they are not all moving in the
same way or at the same tempo. Whether the leaps forward that have
been taken in the Coal and Steel Community and Common Market
treaties will serve to accelerate and consolidate these national pro85. The powers of the Court of Justice in respect of appeals are set out
in Articles 170 to 174. As to the interpretation of corresponding provisions
in the Coal and Steel Community Treaty see VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 71-76 (1954).

86. In November, 1953, the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community
was asked whether it could take action in respect of price agreements
among steel producers relating to exports. It was suggested that these
arrangements, which appeared to be analogous to the pre-war International
Steel Cartel, might produce unfavourable reactions, particularly in AngloSaxon countries. The High Authority replied that it had noted reactions
from Anglo-Saxon countries and others and that it did appear that consumers
in these countries feared that fixed prices might be higher than they would
be in the absence of the agreement. Although it could, after consulting
various bodies, fix maximum export prices, it said that the prohibitions
against price fixing did not apply to export arrangements: "The provisions
of Article 65 refer solely to all forms of concerted action of which the effect
might be felt on the common market. Agreements relating to competition in
the export trade which do not apply to the competitive conditions of the common market are not, however, covered by the general prohibition."
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gressions is not presently clear. Certainly they should encourage
stricter controls by local authorities, but in the operation of common
markets national rivalries may tend to protect combinations which
are designed to promote national economic interests. Until these
regional controls are more fully established, enforcement will be left
to national authorities. During the initial period, therefore, national
interests may continue to influence decisions, but eventually the governing factor will undoubtedly be the regional interest and national
antitrust laws will then be relegated to a position similar to that occupied by our own laws.
It is a characteristic of both regional and national laws that restrictive practices and economic concentrations are to be tested
against the welfare of the relevant communities. 87 Prohibitions in
general terms, and even declarations of nullity, will undoubtedly be
construed as merely presumptive and operative only after particular
situations are found to lack justification; they may even be construed
as applicable only where harmful effects or abuses are established. As
commercial prosperity is the life blood of every community, administrative agencies, whose task it will be to apply these laws will doubtless have regard to the effect which they will have upon general economic conditions in the community. Interferences by the authorities of
other communities would hardly be compatible with the orderly administration of the governing law. Resistance to outside interferences
is to be expected and the members of a community and their governments will resent any suggestion that commercial behavior within
the relevant territorial limits is to be governed by any "foreign" law.
Where such a foreign law is intruded, by the issuance of subpoenas
to produce witnesses or documents in relation to activities outside
the territorial limits of the community whose law is asserted, or by the
imposition of court orders or decrees, the parties affected inevitably
protest against such an interference with their liberties. In view of
the penalties which may be suffered if these court processes are
ignored, and the consequences moreover of complying with orders of
dissolution and reconstruction, is it not apparent that such intrusions
constitute just such an exercise of State power as the court in the
Lotus case said was "prohibited" by international law?
The justification claimed may be two-fold. First, it may be said that
the application by a court of its own criminal law to the acts of a
foreign national abroad does not constitute the exercise of power any87. Cf. Eckhoff, supra note 74, at 301, citing the case of a boycott by Norwegian tobacco dealers of hotels and restaurants handling the products of a

foreign tobacco company; and the British REPORT ON THE SUPPLY AND EXPORT
OF PNEumATxc TYREs, 128 (June 24, 1955), where the Monoplies and Restrictive

Practices Commission condemned price fixing on the domestic market but
concluded, with reference to foreign markets, that "discussions and understandings about prices between Dunlop and the foreign associations and manufacturers... are not against the public interest."
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where but within the territory of the State where the court is sitting.
Second, it may be claimed that, even if such a foreign exercise of power
does occur, the society of nations has agreed that this is permissible
where the offence being punished is one against the security of the
prosecuting State or its currency or it is established that the acts
abroad have produced effects within the territory of such State.
As regards the first ground, it may well be that in the case of an
ordinary crime the prosecuting State is doing no more than exercise
its sovereign power within its own territory where the culprit is
being punished. The degree of its interference with the affairs of a
foreign State will depend on the nature of the crime, its objective and
the connection between the act abroad and the effect within the territory of the prosecuting State.
In the case of the so-called economic crime, however, it is doing much
more than this. It is punishing industrial and commercial enterprises
abroad which are lawfully carrying on their businesses under the laws
of their own countries. Antitrust decrees may enjoin such concerns
from performing contracts lawfully made and operating abroad; they
may require them to divest themselves of valuable property investments abroad; they may compel the licensing of patents or the transfer
of property; or they may require the dissolution or reconstitution of
foreign companies. Admittedly the aim of the prosecuting State is the
reconstruction of foreign economic groupings, contracts and properties
so as to dissipate harmful effects on its own economy. The institution
of proceedings against foreign nationals designed to achieve such an
objective clearly constitutes the exercise of State power within the
territories of the other States where the decrees are to take effect. The
protests of foreign governments relative to grand jury subpoenas
evidences the concern of such governments at these penal thrusts
into their territories.
As regards the other ground, it is evident from these protests that
consent has not in fact been given to these extraterritorial applications. 88 Does the acceptance by the International Court of the principle of objective territoriality and the widespread acceptance of the
protective principle evidence an overriding general consent? Wholly
apart from the positive prohibition recognized by the Court and
referred to above, it is submitted that no such consent can be extended
to the prosecution of foreign nationals for the "crime" of antitrust
any more than it could be implied in the case of any other form of
economic control. No general consent can be found for the application
of such controls to the activities of foreign nationals in territories
where such activities are lawful.
For example, the United States would not tolerate the prosecution
88. See notes 19, 58 supra.
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by European states of New York dealers in foreign exchange who buy
and sell currencies in New York contrary to the prohibitions of
European exchange control laws. Nor would it or any other nation tolerate foreign control over the imposition of tariffs on the admission of
foreign goods. In both cases, however, the activities of private parties
may produce harmful effects in the countries concerned. The run on
sterling in August and September, 1957, is evidence of harmful effects
in the former case and combinations of American watch manufacturers
to raise the duty on imported watches is an instance of the latter.
And yet, if Switzerland, for example, were to prosecute American
watch manufacturers for having combined to keep out Swiss watches
on the ground that their activities were directed at and produced
harmful effects in Switzerland, could it be contended that the United
States had consented to such an exercise of Swiss power because it accepted the objective territorial principle? If the answer to this question is in the negative, must it not follow that the United States cannot legitimately prosecute foreign manufacturers who combine abroad
in a lawful manner even though the effect of such combination may
be to restrain our own exports? Has the objective principle, or the
doctrine of "effects", any relevance in this area?
However sound it may be as a matter of international law to localize
the commission of a common crime at the place where acts abroad produce their effects or to prosecute aliens for plotting abroad to overthrow the State or destroy its currency, no consent on the part of any
nation is apparent to the application of these concepts to the area of
trade regulation. A variety of economic activities within a country
may produce effects beyond its borders and the closer the peoples
of different States are brought together by modern methods of travel
and communication and the more dynamic their own economic systems
become the greater these effects are bound to be.
If effects were enough to justify the regulation by one country of
trade in another, there would be a large number of controls operating
in each country. These would increase as barriers of distance and
language separating nations disappear and the foreign effects of economic activities become more pronounced. There is no evidence that
such a proliferation of economic controls would be acceptable to
any nation.
On the level of antitrust it is enough to note that no restrictive or
monopolistic practice is a common crime under any of the laws considered in this article. Not even in Great Britain, whose system of
law comes closest to our own and with whom we share a common
moral and ethical inheritance, is any such practice a crime. The people of that country have rejected the "odour of criminality" 8 9 To
89. See Lord Mancroft, HANSARD, H. L.,

July

26, 1956, col. 335.
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permit any nation to denounce as a crime and to punish under its own
law the business behavior of foreign nationals in countries where such
behavior is lawful is to infect the business communities of such countries with the very odors that they have been at pains to avoid.
So fundamentally different are these economic offenses from the
common or political crimes to which the objective and protective
principles have been considered applicable that it is impossible to
deduce from the recognition given by States to such principles any
consent to their extension to antitrust or other laws regulating competition. In the absence of consent is not the governing principle that
each community has an absolute and exclusive right to deal with this
subject in its own territory, in its own way, or not to deal with it at all?
If the customary rules of international law recognized in the Lotus
case are to be observed and conflicts with other States are to be
avoided, a recognition of this principle in antitrust cases would appear
to be essential.

